



Abusing the Type System for Fun and for Profit







By Conrad Ludgate

Featuring very scary software mistakes, and even scarier type signatures...



Why do WE USE RUST?



"Modern APIs, high-level features, and C-speed"





"safety by default, generally not a pain to write"





"It makes my friends think I'm smart"





"The crab is kinda cute tho..."





WRONG

You use Rust because of the type system.



But what is a type system?

The Oxford English Dictionary defines it as...

Thank you for visiting Oxford English Dictionary

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
But what is a type system?



The type system categorises data.

The type system should not make use sad.

They often do.



Your sadness looking at this pie chart

89,526,124

Types were diagnosed with [object Object] last year.





Payment handling

Are you sure your payments are only executed once, and that you don't double-charge your customers?

Affine types

Payment lifecycle

Send request

Your customer requests to purchase a product

Process request

You handle the request, and send the notification to the bank

Funds acquired

You take your customers money. Happy days

Because stuff always breaks, you stick some retries here... oops... you just charged your customer twice...



Naive solution: state machine

```
pub enum PaymentState {
    Initiated,
    Processed,
    Completed,
}
impl PaymentState {
    pub fn update(&mut self, event: Event) → Result<()> {
        match (self, event) {
            (Self::Initiated, Event::Processed) ⇒ {
               *self = Self::Processed;
               acquire_funds();
            }
            (Self::Processed, Event::Funds) ⇒ {
               *self = Self::Completed,
            }
            (_, _) ⇒ bail!("invalid event")
            }
        }
}
```

pub enum PaymentState {
 Initiated,
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```
impl PaymentState {
    pub fn update(&mut self, event: Event) → Result<()> {
        match (self, event) {
            (Self::Processed, Event::Processed) ⇒ {
            *self = Self::Processed;
            acquire_funds();
        }
        (Self::Initiated, Event::Processed) ⇒ {
            // out of order sequence, that's ok
            Ok(())
```

(Self::Processed, Event::Funds) ⇒ {
 *self = Self::Completed,

```
(_, _) \Rightarrow bail!("invalid event")
```



The solution is simple



Affine types

Can only be used

At most once

pub enum PaymentState {
 Initiated(Initiated),
 Processed(Processed),
 Completed(Completed),

```
}
```

```
impl PaymentState {
    pub fn update(self, event: Event) → Result<Self> {
        Ok(match self {
            Self::Initiated(i) ⇒ Self::Processed(i.update(event)?),
            Self::Processed(i) ⇒ Self::Completed(i.update(event)?),
            Self::Completed(i) ⇒ bail!("already completed"),
        })
```

```
impl Initiated {
    fn update(self, event: Event) → Result<Processed> {
        match event {
            Event::Processed ⇒ {
                acquire_funds();
                Processed
            }
            _ ⇒ bail!("can only go from initiated to processed")
```



USE OWNERShip

Make each state a custom type, and use the type system to make sure it only progresses forward pub enum PaymentState {
 Initiated(Initiated),
 Processed(Processed),
 Completed(Completed),
}
impl PaymentState {

pub fn update(self, event: Event) → Result<Self> {
 Ok(match self {
 Self::Initiated(i) ⇒ Self::Processed(i.update(event)?),
 Self::Processed(i) ⇒ Self::Completed(i.update(event)?),
 Self::Completed(i) ⇒ bail!("already completed"),
 })
}



Case study: Rustls

goto fail

This is the name of a vulnerability in Apple Secure Transport CVE-2014-1266. This boiled down to the following code, which validates the server's signature on the key exchange:

if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
 goto fail;
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)

```
goto fail;
```

```
> goto fail;
```

```
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
goto fail;
```

The marked line was duplicated, likely accidentally during a merge. This meant the remaining part of the function (including the actual signature validation) was unconditionally skipped.

Case study: Rustls

impl State<ClientConnectionData> for ExpectCertificate {

fn handle(mut self: Box<Self>, cx: &mut ClientContext<'_>, m: Message) → hs::NextStateOrError {
 let cert_chain = require_handshake_msg!(

m,

HandshakeType::Certificate, HandshakePayload::CertificateTls13

)?;

self.transcript.add_message(&m);

let server_cert =

ServerCertDetails::new(cert_chain.convert(), cert_chain.get_end_entity_ocsp());

Ok(Box::new(ExpectCertificateVerify {
 config: self.config,
 server_name: self.server_name,
 randoms: self.randoms,
 suite: self.suite,
 transcript: self.transcript,
 key_schedule: self.key_schedule,
 server_cert,
 client_auth: self.client_auth,
}))

}



AlgoRithmic Lucidity Are you safe from the alg:none vulnerability?

New Types and Marker Types



Not even Microsoft is safe

It has been <u>36 days</u> since the last alg:none JWT vulnerability.

An unauthenticated attacker could <u>impersonate any user in SharePoint 2019</u> by using an alg:none JWT for OAuth authentication.

Algorithm Lucidity 🦉

Algorithm Lucidity refers to resilience against algorithm confusion attacks.

This document aims to make it easy for PASETO implementations to achieve this property.

PASETO Cryptography Key Requirements 2

Cryptography keys in PASETO are defined as both the raw key material and its parameter choices, not just the raw key material.

PASETO implementations **MUST** enforce some logical separation between different key types; especially when the raw key material is the same (i.e. a 256-bit opaque blob).

Arbitrary strings (or byte arrays, or equivalent language constructs) **MUST NOT** be accepted as a key in any PASETO library, **UNLESS** it's an application-specific encoding that encapsulates both the key and an algorithm identifier. (For example, a <u>k2,local</u> <u>PASERK</u>.)

In order to allow for key interoperability between different PASETO libraries, any PASETO library SHOULD support the local, public and secret types from PASERK.

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
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```
class SymmetricKey extends Key {
    public SymmetricKey(byte[] keyMaterial, Version version) {
        super(keyMaterial, version);
    }
```

public bool isKeyValidFor(Version v, Purpose p) {
 return v = this.version && p = Purpose.PURPOSE_LOCAL;



Introducing pasta-tokens

```
pub struct V3;
pub struct V4;
```

// the type system has checked that our key version is correct :

Introducing pasta-tokens

impl<V: version::Version> FromStr for EncryptedToken<V> {
 type Err = PasetoError;

fn from_str(s: &str) → Result<Self, Self::Err> {
 // ensure token starts with `v3.local.` or `v4.local.`
 let s = s.strip_prefix(V::PASET0_HEADER).ok_or(PasetoError::InvalidToken)?;
 let s = s.strip_prefix(".local.").ok_or(PasetoError::InvalidToken)?;

Turing completeness

The type system is Turing complete... I'm sorry...

Turing completeness





type X = <P3 as Add<P4>>::Output; assert_eq!(<X as Integer>::to_i32(), 7);

use std::ops::Add; use typenum::{Integer, P3, P4};

What is typenum?

How is typenum?

How does typenum?

```
impl<Ul: Unsigned, Ur: Unsigned> Add<UInt<Ur, B1>> for UInt<Ul, B1>
where
    Ul: Add<Ur>,
    Sum<Ul, Ur>: Add<u><B1></u>,
    type Output = UInt<Add1<Sum<Ul, Ur>>>, B0>;
    #[inline]
    fn add(self, rhs: UInt<Ur, B1>) \rightarrow Self::Output {
        UInt {
            msb: self.msb + rhs.msb + B1,
            lsb: B0,
```



Why does typenum?


```
pub trait OutputSizeUser {
   type OutputSize: ArrayLength<u8> + 'static;
}
pub type Output<T> = GenericArray<u8, <T as OutputSizeUser>::OutputSize>;
pub trait Digest: OutputSizeUser {
   fn new() > Self;
   fn update(&mut self, data: impl AsRef<[u8]>);
   fn finalize(self) > Output<Self>;
```



Introducing a 2-3 tree. Written in the typesystem

2-3 Tree Examples

Given a collection of three or more values, there are several 2-3 trees containing those values. For instance, below are all four distinct 2-3 trees containing first 7 positive integers.



What is a 2-3 tree?

It's a self-balancing tree that has guaranteed log(n) insertion and retrieval lookup times

Step 1: A node

```
pub struct Node<T, D: TreeDepth<T>>> {
    pub pivots: Pivots<T, D>,
    pub tail: Child<T, D>,
```

```
pub enum Pivots<T, D: TreeDepth<T>> {
    One([(Child<T, D>, T); 1]),
    Two([(Child<T, D>, T); 2]),
```

Each non-terminal node must have at least 1 pivot, and at least 2 children.

Step 2: A child-node

```
type Child<T, D> = <D as TreeDepth<T>>::Child;
```

```
impl<T> TreeDepth<T> for U0 {
   type Child = ();
```

```
impl<T, U: Sub1> TreeDepth<T> for U
where
    super::Sub1<U>: TreeDepth<T>,
{
    type Child = Node<T, super::Sub1<U>>;
```

A terminal node's children are leaf objects (using unit type here)

A non-terminal node's children are more nodes



Step 3: A root-node

impl<T, U: Sub1> TreeRoot<T> for U
where

super::Sub1<U>: TreeDepth<T>,

type RootNode = Node<T, U>;

impl<T> TreeRoot<T> for U0 {
 type RootNode = RootNode<T>;
}

pub enum RootNode<T> {
 Empty,
 Partial(Node<T, U0>),


A terminal root-node can have 0 pivots/children A non-terminal root-node is a regular node



It's as simple as that...

```
impl<T: Ord, U: TreeDepth<T, Child = Node<T, crate::Sub1<U>>> + Sub1> Insert<T> for Node<T, U>
where
   crate::Sub1<U>: TreeDepth<T>,
   Child<T, U>: Insert<T, Depth = crate::Sub1<U>>,
   type Depth = U;
       let Self { pivots, tail } = self;
        match pivots {
            \underline{Pivots::One([x]) if k < x.1 \Rightarrow match x.0.insert(k) }
                Ok(InsertOverflow::Same(x0)) ⇒ Ok(InsertOverflow::Same(Self {
                    pivots: Pivots::One([(x0, x.1)]),
                    pivots: Pivots::Two([(l, p), (r, x.1)]),
                Err((x0, t)) \Rightarrow Err((
```





Happy Halloween!

Any questions? You can find me at @conradludgate in most places

